Justifying Electronic Banking Network Expansion Using Real Option Pricing: An Empirical Illustration by Benaroch, Michel & KAUFFMAN, Robert J.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
6-2000
Justifying Electronic Banking Network Expansion
Using Real Option Pricing: An Empirical
Illustration
Michel Benaroch
Syracuse University
Robert J. KAUFFMAN
Singapore Management University, rkauffman@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/3250936
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and
the Management Information Systems Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized administrator of
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Benaroch, Michel and KAUFFMAN, Robert J.. Justifying Electronic Banking Network Expansion Using Real Option Pricing: An
Empirical Illustration. (2000). MIS Quarterly. 24, (2), 197-225. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2149
Benaroch & Kauffman/Electronic Banking & Real Options Analysis
MIS Quarterly Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 197-225/June 2000 197
RESEARCH ARTICLE
JUSTIFYING ELECTRONIC BANKING
NETWORK EXPANSION USING REAL
OPTIONS ANALYSIS1
By: Michel Benaroch
School of Management
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY  13244-2130
U.S.A.
mbenaroc@syr.edu
Robert J. Kauffman
Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN  55455
U.S.A.
rkauffman@csom.umn.edu
Abstract
The application of real options analysis to
information technology investment evaluation
problems recently has been proposed in the IS
literature (Chalasani et al. 1997; Dos Santos
1991; Kambil et al. 1993; Kumar 1996; Taudes
1998).  The research reported on in this paper
illustrates the value of applying real options
analysis in the context of a case study involving
the deployment of point-of-sale (POS) debit
services by the Yankee 24 shared electronic
banking network of New England.  In the course of
1Robert Zmud was the accepting senior editor for this
paper.
so doing, the paper also attempts to operation-
alize real options analysis concepts by examining
claimed strengths of this analysis approach and
balancing them against methodological difficulties
that this approach is believed to involve.  The
research employs a version of the Black-Scholes
option pricing model that is adjusted for risk-
averse investors, showing how it is possible to
obtain reliable values for Yankee 24’s “investment
timing option,” even in the absence of a market to
price it.  To gather evidence for the existence of
the timing option, basic scenario assumptions,
and the parameters of the adjusted Black-Scholes
model, a structured interview format was devel-
oped.  The results obtained using real options
analysis enabled the network’s senior manage-
ment to identify conditions for which entry into the
POS debit market would be profitable.  These
results also indicated that, in the absence of
formal evaluation of the timing option, traditional
approaches for evaluating information technology
investments would have produced the wrong
recommendations.
Keywords:  Black-Scholes model, investment
decision making under uncertainty, electronic
banking networks, POS debit systems, project
investments, IT investment evaluation, option
pricing models, real options.  
ISRL Categories:  AK0101, AM, DB03, EF07,
EI01, EI225, HB05, HB11
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When you make an initial investment in
a research project, you are paying an
entry fee for a right....To me, all business
decisions are options.
—J. Lewent, CFO Merck & Co.,
in a Harvard Business Review
interview (Nichols 1994).
I have become convinced that it is time
to revisit the usefulness of NPV and to
reconsider just how much stock we want
to place in it....For most investments, the
usefulness of the NPV rule is severely
limited.  If modern finance is to have a
practical and salutary impact on invest-
ment decision making, it is now obligated
to treat all major investment decisions as
option pricing problems.
—Stephen Ross, Yale University
Sterling Professor of Economics
and Finance, in a keynote speech
to the 1994 Financial Management
Association Annual Meeting
Introduction
The application of option pricing models (OPM) to
information technology (IT) investment evaluation
problems recently has been proposed in the
information systems (IS) literature (Chalasani et
al. 1997; Dos Santos 1991; Kambil et al. 1993;
Kumar 1996; Taudes 1998).  These papers make
a strong case for new methods, in addition to
traditional net present value (NPV) or discounted
cash flow (DCF) approaches, and especially in
lieu of leaving hard decisions that senior
managers face regarding IT investment to exper-
ienced intuition.  Benaroch and Kauffman (1999)
are the first to follow up on these proposals.  They
examine the theoretical basis for applying OPMs
to IT investment evaluation as well as the range of
evaluation situations where various OPMs can be
applied in light of their underlying assumptions.
Moreover, they illustrate the feasibility of using a
specific OPM, the Black-Scholes model, to
analyze a real deferral option on the deployment
of point-of-sale (POS) debit services by the
Yankee 24 shared electronic banking network of
New England.
Yet, to date there has not been a study that truly
tests the claimed strengths of OPMs in the context
of IT evaluation problems while balancing these
strengths against the methodological difficulties
that OPMs are believed to involve.  The need for
such a study is fueled by the expansion of work on
real options along two fronts.  On one front, the
business world started to seriously attempt to
apply OPMs.  For example, in a Harvard Business
Review interview, the Chief Financial Officer of
Merck & Co., discusses ways her firm evaluates
research and development projects intended to
yield new drugs by applying OPMs to abandon-
ment, growth, and investment staging options
embedded in these projects (Nichols 1994).
Trigeorgis (1996) provides other examples of how
these models are applied to real-world business
investments, including natural resource mining
projects involving deferral, abandonment, and
expansion options.
Along another front, recent empirical studies have
begun providing evidence in favor of using OPMs.
In a survey of how financial officers deal with
flexibility in capital appraisal, Busby and Pitts
(1997, p. 169) found that “very few decision
makers seemed to be aware of real option
research but, mostly, their intuitions agreed with
the qualitative prescriptions of such work.”  Axel
and Howell (1996) offer stronger results based on
a laboratory study with 82 experienced managers
from large British companies.  The study found
that managers unaided by OPMs tended to
overvalue real options, although their valuations
did not differ significantly from those produced by
these models.  While this study suggests that
managers can decide in a manner analogous to
OPMs without having learned these models, it
also shows that the least overvaluation tendency
was among managers from the oil and pharma-
ceutical industries, two industries already using
real option models in capital budgeting.  Overall,
the study indicates that OPMs are adequate for
formalizing managers’ intuition and that familiarity
with these models can improve the valuation of
investments involving options.
In this light, the present paper seeks to evaluate
and operationalize relevant real options analysis
concepts in the IS context.  Relative to our earlier
paper (Benaroch and Kauffman 1999), the
intended contribution of this paper is threefold.
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1. We present the case study details behind
Yankee 24's IT investment in POS debit
services (the example in Benaroch and
Kauffman 1999), describe the structured
interview used to obtain from Yankee 24's
senior management evidence that enabled us
to analyze this investment from a real options
perspective, and subsequently use the analy-
sis results to offer case study insights specific
to electronic banking service deployment
decision making.
2. We put to a real test the claimed strengths
and weaknesses of the Black-Scholes model
to show the pragmatic value of applying this
model to realistic IT investment evaluation
problems.  We specifically focus on two traits
of the model.  One trait concerns the inves-
tor’s risk preferences assumed.  In our earlier
paper, we explained the economic basis for
the risk-neutral valuation (defined later) of the
Black-Scholes model being valid in the
context of IT investments embedding options,
even in the absence of a market for IT
investments.  Yet, some researchers and
practitioners continue to claim that this model
would tend to overvalue options because
decision makers are usually risk-averse.
Subsequently, we investigate the extent to
which this claim applies to the analysis
results that the Black-Scholes model
produces for our case by adjusting these
results for risk-averse investors.  The second
trait pertains to sensitivity analysis.  We pre-
sented the Black-Scholes’ partial derivatives
as a powerful sensitivity analysis tool
(Benaroch and Kauffman 1999).  We scru-
tinize this claim in the context of our case,
showing that the use of partial derivative
analysis must be largely supplemented by the
use of conventional simulation-based sensi-
tivity analysis.
3. We examine methodological issues involved
in using OPMs.  We discuss factors that must
be carefully analyzed before an IT investment
decision like the one we study can be cast as
a real options analysis problem (what kind of
option is involved, what is the option’s
underlying asset, where does the option
come from and at what cost, etc.).  We also
assess the claim that the estimation of certain
option parameters (e.g., variability of the
option’s underlying asset) involves major
difficulties and thus present practical guide-
lines that can help to alleviate those claimed
difficulties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  The
next section introduces the fundamentals of OPMs
and then explains why these models can be
applied to IT investments embedding options.
The third section discusses preliminary case study
details that enable the reader to understand the
nature of Yankee 24’s IT investment decision and
the need to apply real options analysis to this
decision.  We then analyze Yankee 24’s invest-
ment decision from a real options perspective and
outline the structured interview we conducted with
Yankee 24’s senior executives in order to obtain
details for framing the decision as a real deferral
option and to elicit parameter values for the OPM
used.  The analysis results are presented and we
examine  the ability of partial derivative analysis
concepts to deliver useful investment decision
making guidance.  Finally, a retrospective inter-
pretation is offered of why the recommendations
that our real options analysis yielded would have
been well suited to what actually happened in
Yankee 24’s markets.  The paper concludes with
a discussion of the primary contributions of this
research and revisits some methodological issues
that warrant additional investigation.
Pricing Real IT
Investment Options
We next review the concepts underlying real
options analysis and the fundamental models for
analyzing project investment decisions involving
real options.  We also discuss the economic
rationale underlying the use of option pricing
models for the evaluation of IT investments
embedding real options.
Value of Managerial Flexibility and
Project Evaluation Methods
Research on real options seeks to address
criticism concerning the inadequacy of traditional
capital budgeting methods for evaluating a project
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that offers management the flexibility to take
actions which can change traits of the project over
time (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  The term flexibility
is “nothing more (or less) than a description of the
options made available to management as part of
the project” (Mason and Merton 1985, p. 32).  This
flexibility adds value to the passive NPV of a
project, where one has assumed that no in-project
actions are possible to affect its expected value
outcomes.  It changes the probability distribution
of project payoffs asymmetrically by enhancing
the upside potential or reducing the downside risk.
This corresponds to the notion of an active NPV,
whose expected value trajectory is controllable by
management.   Figure 1 illustrates these changes
and provides examples of specific real options
that cause them.  Real options offering in-project
flexibility are termed operating options.  They differ
from so-called growth options, whose value stems
from future investment opportunities that they
open up.  For more background information on
real options from the capital budgeting literature,
the reader is referred to Amram and Kulatilaka
(1999), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Trigeorgis
(1996).
Two approaches commonly used to evaluate
investments are DCF (NPV) analysis and decision
tree analysis (DTA) (see Figure 2).  In addition to
the theoretical reasons for these approaches
being inadequate for investments involving
options (Benaroch and Kauffman 1999), a
pragmatic question is:  Why can’t they be adapted
to such investments?
The key problem with adapting DCF analysis is
that it can evaluate only the actual cash flows a
project is expected to yield.  DCF analysis does
not explicitly recognize that managerial flexibility
has a value equivalent to a “shadow,” non-actual
cash flow.  Such flexibility is borne by the
presence of embedded options and it allows
management to adjust traits of the investment
(timing, scope, scale, etc.) to changing environ-
mental conditions.  Even if DCF analysis were to
consider this shadow cash flow, or option value,
risk-adjusted discounting remains a problem.
Because the risk of an option is not the same as
that of actual cash flows, and because this risk
changes as a function of time and the uncertain
size of actual cash flows, it is neither possible to
predict the option risk nor find a risk-adjusted
discount rate that applies to it.
DTA provides a significant conceptual improve-
ment over the way DCF analysis handles options.
A decision tree shows the expected project
payoffs contingent on future in-project actions that
management can take over time (e.g., abandon
an operational project at time t, if the salvage
value of resources used exceeds the payoffs
arriving after t).  As the tree represents each
action as a decision node, corresponding to an
option, evaluating the project requires working
backward from the future to the present to
calculate how much the presence of these actions
adds to the project value.  This approach yields
useful results only after poor tree branches are
pruned.  Pruning means finding out how em-
bedded options alter the range of expected
payoffs and then adjusting the discount rate to
recognize the change in risk (or variability of
payoffs).  Unfortunately, DTA provides no direct
basis for discount rate adjustment (Brealey and
Myers 1988, p. 228).  Only with a proper modi-
fication involving an estimation of the investor’s
(management) utility function can DTA be
adequately applied to projects embedding options
(for details, see Smith and Nau 1995).
Real options analysis strives to complement the
other two approaches, in light of the difficulties
involved in adapting these approaches to invest-
ments embedding options.  It looks at the active
NPV of a project as the sum of the passive NPV
and the value of embedded options.  The intuition
behind how it evaluates an embedded option
resides in two factors.  First, it models payoff con-
tingencies using a probability distribution function
(e.g., log-normal, binomial), enabling it to translate
the presence of an option into expectations of
shifts in this distribution.  Second, it replaces the
actual probabilities of payoffs by risk-neutral
(certainty-equivalent) probabilities, to facilitate
discounting by the risk-free rate instead of a risk-
adjusted rate.  This is equivalent to allowing an
analyst to prune unattractive branches in a deci-
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contribution of the
real option
ABANDONMENT: ability to abandon an ongoing project
investment and to direct salvageable resources to
alternate more valuable uses
Option enhances the upside potential by possibly opening
future project investment opportunities, thus pushing
upwards the right tail of the probability distribution of the
investment outcome
Option reduces the downside potential by possibly
lowering the project's cost and/or failure risk, thus pushing
downwards the left tail of the probability distribution of
the investment outcome
LEASING: ability to outsource a project in order to
"transfer" the risk of project failure
EXPAND: ability to scale up a project investment when
market demand for products or services produced by the
project appears to be building
DEFERRAL: deferring a decision to invest in one IT instead
of another (e.g., Windows vs. OS/2) may allow buying
into emerging standards
DEFERRAL: ability to defer a project until a new less
costly technology is proven feasible, without losing the
investment opportunity
ExamplesExamples
probability distribution of the passive NPV
probability distribution of the active NPV
Evaluation Approach
Discounted cash flow
and NPV analysis
Decision tree analysis
Option pricing analysis
Workings and Concerns
Calculate the passive NPV using a discount rate that ignores the upside
potential, and add to it the value contributed by the embedded option.
Evaluate the branches, prune unattractive branches, and calculate the
project’s active NPV based on the remaining branches.
A difficulty is in choosing the appropriate option pricing model to match
the key elements of the investment being analyzed.  And, whichever is the
chosen model, it is necessary to identify the extent to which key
assumptions of that model are suitable in the scenario being analyzed.
Once the tree has been pruned, it is hard to find a proper risk-adjusted
discount rate that reflects the change in the dispersion (variance) of
outcome.
Calculate the project's NPV based on actual expected cash flows and an
appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate.
DCF and NPV methods do not see the “shadow” cash flow borne by an
embedded option (in-project flexibility).  Even if these methods were to be
adjusted, no single risk-adjusted discount rate could be applied to this
“shadow” cash flow because it changes as a function of time and the
uncertain nature of actual cash flows expected from the project.
invest?
revenues
low
no (wait)
yes
outcome node
decision node (option)
pruned branch
high
low
high
Goal:
$
Payoffs (V)
investment
value (V – X)  Cost (X)
probability
(project
revenues)
(project
expenses)
Evaluate a project investment
embedding a real option, by
incorporating information about
the asymmetric distribution of
expected payoffs.
revenues
...
...
...
...
passive 
NPV
Contribution of
the real option
probability
$
passive 
NPV
Contribution of
shadow cash flow
probability
$
Figure 1.  Asymmetry of the Probability Distribution of Project Payoffs When
Real Operating Options Are Involved
Figure 2.  Comparsion of Common Capital Budgeting Evaluation Approaches
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sion tree without having to worry about discount
rate adjustment.2  However, these factors raise
two issues.  The first requires estimating the
variability of uncertain payoffs and costs modeled
using probability distributions.  As to the other
factor, the validity of discounting by the risk-free
rate is questionable when options are not traded
in a market.  We return to these issues later, to
show that they do not limit the applicability of real
options analysis to IT options.
In the rest of this section, we formalize real option
pricing concepts based on prior work in finance.
We focus in particular on deferral options because
the case study we present in later sections
involves a deferral option.
Option Pricing Concepts Applied
to Real Deferral Options
The fundamental options are financial calls and
puts.  A European call (put) on some underlying
asset, whose current value is V, gives its holder
the right to buy (sell) the asset for an agreed
exercise price, X, at a fixed expiration date, T.  For
instance, a “June 99 call” on IBM stock with a $75
strike price allows its holder to buy IBM shares for
$75 on June 15, 1999.  This call is worth exer-
cising only if the value of an IBM share on June 15
exceeds $75, in which case it is said to be in-the-
money.  Thus, the terminal value of a call, or its
value on expiration, CT, is max(0, VT – X), where
VT is the terminal value of the underlying asset.
An American option is like a European option, but
it can be exercised at any time t, t @ T.  We first
focus on European calls because they are simpler
to understand, and later return to discuss
American options.
The current value of a call, C, is partially deter-
mined by the volatility (variability) of the underlying
asset’s value, c, and the length of time to its
maturity, T.  Before the option expires, V can go
down only to zero (downside risk limit) or up to
infinity (unlimited upside potential).  This asym-
metrical distribution of V means that, the higher c
is, the greater is the chance that VT will exceed X
for the call to end in-the-money and the higher is
the call value.  Likewise, the longer is the time to
expiration, T, the more chance there is that V will
rise above X, so that the call will end in-the-
money.  So far we see that C depends on para-
meters V, X, T, and c.  We will see that C also
depends on the risk-free interest rate.
For a firm facing a project embedding the right to
defer investment, the analogy with a financial call
is direct.  The firm can get the value of the opera-
tional project via immediate investment, V – X, or
hold on to the investment opportunity.  This is akin
to a call option to convert the opportunity into an
operational project.  The option (opportunity)
offers the flexibility to defer conversion until cir-
cumstances turn most favorable, or to back out if
they are not satisfactory.  Its value corresponds to
the active NPV, equaling the passive NPV plus
the value of the deferral flexibility.   The option
parameters are (1) the time to expiration, T, is the
time that the opportunity can be deferred; (2) the
underlying asset, V, is the present value of risky
payoffs expected upon undertaking the invest-
ment; (3) the exercise price, X, is the irreversible
cost of making the investment; and (4) the
volatility, c, is the standard deviation of risky
payoffs from the investment.  When V can
fluctuate, the unexercised option (opportunity) can
be more valuable than immediate investment,
max(V – X) > V – X.  The value of the option
depends on how much the decision maker
expects to learn about the way the value of risky
payoffs, V, will evolve due to changes that might
occur within the firm or in its environment during
deferral.  The more uncertain is V, the more
learning can take place during deferral, and the
more valuable is the option.  This is consistent
with what finance theory postulates about the
effect of c, the variability of V, on the value of
financial options.
Two basic models for pricing financial options are
the binomial model and the Black-Scholes model
(Hull 1993).  Because these models make similar
2In this sense, real options analysis is an adjusted
version of decision tree analysis, involving a redistri-
bution of probability masses such that risk is reallocated
in a way that allows for discounting by the risk-free rate.
This adjustment usually relies on economic arguments
that permit for the appropriate discount rate to be
extracted from market information, indirectly through
revision of probabilities.
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assumptions and thus compute a similar option
value for options maturing in a year or longer
(Benaroch and Kauffman 1999), we rely here only
on the Black-Scholes model to price the option
identified later in our case study.  The Black-
Scholes model is a closed-form formula that
computes the price of a European call option for a
risk-neutral investor.3  It is written as
(1)
where N(^) is the cumulative normal distribution, V
is an underlying asset that is assumed to be log-
normally distributed so as to reflect the asym-
metric nature of payoffs from an investment
embedding the option (Figure 1), c is the volatility
of V, X is the option’s exercise price, T is the time
to maturity, and rf is the risk-free rate.  This equa-
tion has a simple intuition.  As VT – X is the call’s
terminal in-the-money value,  is the
current in-the-money value.  To cover the case
that the call might be unattractive to exercise, V
and X are weighted by the probabilities N(d1) and
N(d2), respectively.  
In light of the similarity of a deferral option to a
financial option, we should be able to apply the
Black-Scholes model to real IT options.  Benaroch
and Kauffman support this assertion by showing
that the economic rational for the risk-neutrality
assumption of the Black-Scholes model fits in the
context of IT investment evaluation, even though
many IT investments are not traded.  However,
recall that one goal of this paper is to examine the
impact of adjusting the risk-neutral option value
calculated by this model to the case of risk-averse
investors.  This examination is meant to address
the claim that, because most decision makers are
risk-averse, risk-neutral valuation overvalues
options embedded in non-traded investments.
Trigeorgis explains this claim as follows: Mana-
gers evaluating an investment that is subject to a
firm- and/or industry-specific risk not shared by all
market investors must discount the option value
by a factor corresponding to the investment’s
unique risk (p. 101).  Analogously, if the asset
underlying an option is not traded in limited supply
by a large number of investors (so that demand
for the asset exceeds supply), the asset’s return
rate, ?, may fall below the equilibrium expected
rate of return investors require from an equivalent-
risk traded asset, ?*.  The rate of return shortfall,
G = ?* – ?, necessitates an adjustment in the
option valuation. A version of the Black-Scholes
model that reflects this rate shortfall adjustment is
 (1')
A simple conclusion follows.  Risk-neutral valua-
tion does not pose a roadblock to implementing
real options analysis using the Black-Scholes
model.  Even for a non-traded underlying asset,
we can apply risk-neutral valuation using the
Black-Scholes model adjusted by an appropriate
rate of return shortfall, G.4  Following one of our
goals, we later check the impact of adjusting the
Black-Scholes model by G on the analysis results
for the case study presented shortly.
3The Black-Scholes model assumes that the option is
priced for a risk-neutral investor (who is indifferent
between an investment with a certain rate of return and
an investment with an uncertain rate of return whose
expected value matches that of the investment with the
certain rate of return).  Underlying this assumption is a
requirement that V be an asset that is traded in a market
that presents no arbitrage opportunities. Under this
requirement, it is possible to construct a portfolio of other
traded assets that has the same risk as V, where return
on the portfolio must equal the risk-free interest rate, rf.
This is why the Black-Scholes model treats the option
value as a function of rf.
4This adjusted version of the Black-Scholes model is
also used for risk-neutral investors when G is termed the
convenience yield.  The convenience yield is a measure
of the benefits realized from holding an asset (e.g., land)
that are not realized by the holder of an option on that
asset.
Benaroch & Kauffman/Electronic Banking & Real Options Analysis
204 MIS Quarterly Vol. 24 No. 2/June 2000
Option-Based Decision Rule
for Investment Timing
Having seen why it is reasonable to use the Black-
Scholes model in the context of real IT options,
the question that a firm must answer for a
deferrable investment opportunity is:  How long do
we postpone the investment up to T time periods?
Economists study many variants of this kind of
investment-timing problem (e.g., cyclical demand
for goods to be produced by a deferrable project).
They use different specialized solution ap-
proaches, many of which are isomorphic to the
option pricing approach (Bernanke 1983).  For
example, McDonald and Siegel (1986) study the
problem for the case of stochastic project costs,
showing that, under risk-neutrality and non-
stochastic project costs, their model reduces to
the Black-Scholes model.  Likewise, Smit Han and
Ankum (1993) say that the general investment-
timing problem “is analogous to the timing of
exercising of a call option” (p. 242), and thus
explain how the simplicity and clarity of real op-
tions analysis enables them to study the problem
under various competitive market structures.  
From a real options perspective, the intuition
behind the evaluation principle for solving an
investment-timing problem like the one we present
shortly is as follows.  Holding a deferrable invest-
ment opportunity is equivalent to holding an
American call option.  At any moment, the investor
can own either the option (investment opportunity)
or the asset obtained upon exercising the option
(operational investment).  The option parameters
are the present value of risky payoffs from the
investment (V), the cost of making the investment
(X), the standard deviation of risky payoffs (c), the
maximum deferral period (T), and the risk-free
interest rate (rf).  Holding the option unexercised
(postponing investment) for time t has two
competing effects:  V is lowered by the amount of
foregone cash flows and market share lost to
competition and X is lowered because it is
discounted during the deferral period, t.
Depending on the magnitude of these two
tendencies, the value of the option exercised at
time t, Ct, can be higher or lower.  If information
arriving during deferral indicates that V is likely to
exceed original estimates, investment can be
justified by the rise in the payoff expected from
investing; otherwise, the irreversible sunk cost (X)
can be avoided by not investing, at a loss of only
the cost of obtaining the deferral flexibility.
Consequently, the following decision rule leads to
the optimal investment strategy, given today’s
information set.
Decision Rule: Where the maximum
deferral time is T, make the investment
(exercise the option) at time t*, 0 @ t* @ T,
for which the option, Ct*, is positive and
takes on its maximum value.
(2)
where d'1 and d'2 are defined in equation (1'), and
Vt equals V less the present value of foregone
cash flows and market share lost to competition.
Of course, this decision rule has to be reapplied
every time new information arrives during the
deferral period to see how the optimal investment
strategy might change in light of the new
information.
Because the Black-Scholes model is suitable for
pricing only European options, it is not directly
applicable with a decision rule involving an
American deferral option.  However, we will see
later a specific variant of the Black-Scholes model
that can be directly applied with the above
decision rule.
A Planning Retrospective
for Point-of-Sale Debit at
Yankee 24
In this section, we discuss the background of
shared electronic banking services in relation to
Yankee 24 to pave the way for our evaluation of
an IT investment embedding a deferral option.
We examine the investment scenario that Yankee
24 faced in determining whether to deploy POS
debit services and conclude by suggesting the
elements of the scenario that make real options
analysis a useful evaluation alternative.
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Electronic Banking and
Point-of-Sale Debit
Electronic banking was instituted in the mid-1960s
to facilitate the execution of financial transactions
using credit cards.  Due to the popularity of this
service among consumers, retailers rapidly came
to accept credit cards on an almost universal
basis.  This service was followed in the early
1970s by the deployment of automated teller
machines (ATMs).
Later, a “middle ground” service emerged,
combining the speed and ease of a credit card
transaction for the consumer and the low risk of a
credit or check-free transaction for the merchant.
In 1972, First Federal Savings of Lincoln,
Nebraska, was the first bank to install ATM-like
devices in supermarkets, enabling its depositors
to use plastic cards to pay in the Hinky Dinky
supermarket chain.  The mechanism involved a
book transfer at the bank, resulting in a debit to
the purchaser’s account and a credit to the
merchant’s account.  This service became known
as point-of-sale (POS) debit.  Hinky Dinky’s
service was not very successful because it was
confined to First Federal Saving’s depositors.
Retailers simply did not want to install systems
with restricted availability to their broad spectrum
of customers.
Since that time, there were more successful
attempts to establish POS debit services.  Around
1985, for example, four major banks in California
collaborated to introduce the “InterLink” payment
system.  At the time, since these banks held
between 50% and 60% of all checking accounts in
California, retailers, and especially supermarkets,
rapidly adopted the service.  Around the same
time, other shared ATM networks observed the
emergence of this POS debit payment system and
began to consider its applicability to their own
marketplaces.
Electronic Banking and POS Debit
Services in New England
Yankee 24 (hereafter, Yankee), a regional shared
electronic banking network, was established in
1983 by a small group of large banks in
Connecticut to provide cost-effective services
within Connecticut.  Yankee grew to include more
than 200 member firms.  Many member firms
deployed their own ATM hardware and software.
Others outsourced all ATM transaction processing
to the network.  Charges for network services
involved an initial membership fee and fees for all
transactions processed through Yankee’s switch.
Despite its limited focus on Connecticut, by 1985
Yankee became the largest shared network in
New England.  Yankee subsequently expanded to
the remainder of New England, experiencing
400% growth in transactions in 1987.  By 1990, its
ATM transaction volume had reached about 20
million per month.  Table 1 provides additional
information about Yankee and others among the
largest regional shared electronic banking net-
works in the U.S.  This information reveals four
facts about the 1990 time frame.  First, the West
Coast had the largest number of POS terminals
installed by STAR.  Second, NYCE owned about
15% of the POS terminals in the North East, but
none in the New England area.  Third, Yankee
had no POS terminals installed in New England.
Finally, although Yankee is small in terms of the
number of network cards it services, this number
is still significant.
In 1987, Richard Yanak, Yankee’s president, first
considered supporting POS debit network
services.  Yanak’s initial perception was that this
investment in new infrastructure was risky.  But
Yanak also viewed POS debit as a way for
Yankee to expand its franchise in the market,
increase its transactions volume and revenues,
and thus increase the network’s value to its
member firms.  In addition, one potential new
business of interest was applying the POS debit
payment system to the electronic distribution of
food stamps and a host of government welfare
benefits.
Given the strategic nature of a move into POS
debit, Yanak began building a business case that
would convince the board of directors to under-
take this project.  In Yanak’s initial view, entering
this market seemed workable because of its
similarity to the ATM market, which was well
understood by the board of directors.  Both
markets have resulted from societal change in
consumer payments mechanisms and the training
concerns and technological infrastructure em-
ployed are similar.  Yet, it was also clear to Yanak
that the ATM and the POS debit markets would
differ in important ways: in terms of acceptance
rate, demographics, and investment risk.
Table 1.  Overview of the 10 Largest Electronic Banking Networks in 1990 (Source:  Yankee 24)
Network
Name
Date
Formed Ownership Main Market
Network Membership Breakdown
Network
Cards
ATMs
Deployed
(Monthly
Transactions)
POS Debit
Terminals
(Monthly
Transactions)Banks S&Ls
Credit
Unions
NYCE 10/84 9 NYC banks
NY, PA, NJ and
New England
298 133 91 16.5MM
9,504
(63.8MM)
1,639
(.7MM)
STAR 7/84
17 member
firms
CA, NV, AZ, OR,
HI, UT, WA
177 845 249 20.3MM
10,851
(61.6MM)
11,121
(1.4MM)
MAC 9/79
Core States
Financial Corp.
PA, NJ, DE,
NY, WV, MD
472 249 222 17.5MM
7,405
(48.3MM)
9,924
(.5MM)
Most 7/84
28 member
firms
DC, VA, MD, TN,
WV, DE, KY
264 73 98 7.7MM
4,029
(37.3MM)
872
(<.1MM)
Pulse 7/81
1,476  member
firms
TX, OK, LA,
NM, AR
1,162 129 185 8.5MM
5,110
(32.1MM)
3,247
(.5MM)
Money
Station
4/83
7 member
firms
OH, WV, KY,
IN, MI, PA
220 126 154 4.9MM
2,998
(22.8MM)
507
(.1MM)
Yankee
24
8/83
740 member
firms
CT, ME, MA,
RI, NH, VT
370 95 275 4.8MM
3,891
(20.0MM)
not deployed
Honor 6/83
8 member
firms
FL only 310 92 52 6.7MM
3,228
(19.4MM)
3,984
(.5MM)
Relay 6/82
27 member
firms
NC, SC, VA, GA,
FL, DC, MD
105 64 32 6.9MM
3,079
(19.0MM)
not deployed
Exchange/
Accel
6/73
40 member
firms
WA, OR, ID,
MT, AK, BC
81 31 137 4.8MM
2,960
(18.2MM)
484
(not available)
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investment
value
expected
revenues
+
+
expected
cost
investment needed to create the
telecommunication infrastructure
personnel training costs
marketing costs
+
+
+
expected
revenues
(current
market size)
current consumer acceptance rate
current retailers’ adoption rate
market share lost to competition
that deploys POS services
+
+
-
-
+revenues
variability
(potential
market size)
increase in consumer acceptance rate
when they learn to appreciate the value
of POS debt services
increase in retailers' adoption rate if
POS debit services are proven to be
profitable to retailers and if these
services are made available to a wider
range of customers because more of
Yankee's member banks will offer and
aggressively promote these services
future business opportunities (e.g.,
electronic distribution of government
welfare benefits)
+
+
+
in Massachusetts
in the rest of
New England
Figure 3.  Variables Relevant to Yankee’s Evaluation of POS Debit Deployment
POS Debit Service Startup Timing at
Yankee:  The Justification Issues
Entry into the POS debit business in 1987 was not
without risk, although it was technically feasible,
could have yielded revenues early on, and would
have created entry barriers for competitors.
Before making a decision, Yanak had to analyze
a number of key variables and their relationships
(see Figure 3).
The expected revenues depended on the market
acceptance rate, the market share lost to compe-
tition, and the extent to which these revenues
might deviate up or down.  Relative to the vari-
ability of revenues, while the expected revenues
could turn out slightly worse than those generated
in California until 1987, they could turn out to be
much higher.  For example, the consumer accep-
tance rate and the adoption rate by retailers might
rise and the government might decide at any time
to start delivering welfare benefits electronically.
On the consumers’ side, it was necessary to
understand when sufficient customer demand for
POS debit services would emerge.  California
offered a relevant analogy:  the consumer accep-
tance rate was assumed to parallel the one in
California until 1987.  POS debit services were
quite successful, as suggested by the number of
terminals deployed and transaction volume
processed by STAR, for example (Table 1).  Still
consumer acceptance was considered slow.
Between 1985 and the end of 1991, about 10
million transactions were executed in California by
a population base of 15 million to 20 million card
holders.  While consumers were becoming aware
of the benefits of using plastic cards at ATMs
(e.g., to make bill payments), a clear call for POS
debit services had not yet appeared in the market.
Debit cards were initially less attractive to
consumers than credit cards, since transfer of
funds to the merchant was not postponed by the
no-interest, end-of-the-month billing cycle.  None-
theless, network executives and industry consul-
tants broadly believed that the adoption rate of
POS debit services would parallel that of ATM
services, albeit in a more compressed time frame.
It took 15 to 20 years for ATM adoption to run its
course; acceptance of POS debit services was
expected to occur over a five to eight year period.
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Retailers’ adoption rate was another revenue-
related concern.  Unlike in the ATM business
where clients were bank depositors, Yankee’s
POS debit direct clients were retailers for which
cash and checks (and less often, credit) were the
primary payment vehicles.  These retailers had to
make substantial investments (e.g., in networking
and training cashiers), unlike in the ATM world
where the entire investment is borne by the banks.
While this meant that the investment required by
Yankee and its member banks would be relatively
small, effectively shifting much of the risk of the
rollout to the retailers, it caused many merchants
to hesitate, resulting in spotty geographic cover-
age of POS debit services in New England.
Yankee faced another hindrance:  legislation in
Massachusetts, which includes about 50% of the
New England population, required retailers who
participate in POS debit servicing to be subject to
state banking department scrutiny.  This meant
that Massachusetts retailers might be slower to
adopt POS debit services.  Some would adopt
early on.  Others would wait until the prospect for
a change in the law arose, as legislators began to
see the value of POS debit to consumers.  Some
would wait until POS debit services proved profit-
able enough to justify being under state banking
department scrutiny.
The primary retailers Yankee identified were
supermarkets, gas stations, and convenience
stores.  More financial transactions are executed
in supermarkets than in any other retail arena and
the majority of the transactions are paid in cash.
At the time, New England had about 100 super-
market chains, with the largest 21 selling nearly
75% of all groceries.  Gas stations and conven-
ience stores also used cash as the primary mode
of payment.  Yankee estimated that there were
about 250,000 such retailers in New England who
had the infrastructure in place to process credit
card transactions electronically.  This additional
market was expected to exhibit a lower volume of
transactions per merchant, although, in aggregate,
it was large and would grow significantly.
On the cost side, Yankee had to consider the cost
of creating the telecommunication infrastructure,
personnel training costs, and advertising costs.
These costs were expected to be relatively low,
because the ATM infrastructure acts as a comple-
mentary asset to POS debit capabilities.  (Addi-
tionally, the marginal operating costs per trans-
action were estimated at zero for the transactions
volume expected over the time horizon consi-
dered.)  However, Yankee’s situation in New
England posed some problems.  First, the network
was growing rapidly during 1987, as Yankee
moved to expand its operations into other New
England states.  This required substantial financial
resources not available to Yankee at the time,
placing a strain on the small network management
staff.  Second, it seemed that member banks in
New England would be reluctant participants in an
early rollout of POS debit, given the marginal
returns.  They would balk at incurring the costs of
planning and aggressively promoting the services
to retailers who would use the POS debit services
to garner the income.  But in 1987 and 1988, the
financial services industry throughout the region
(and elsewhere) was under stress.  Many banks
were increasingly choosing to exit from non-core
banking businesses (e.g., insurance, real estate,
etc.) which posed risks that often led to real
losses.
Although Yankee’s senior management was
convinced of the great potential of the POS debit
market, their prevailing attitude was that 1987 was
probably not the best time to enter this market.
This view was supported by the fact that, in 1987,
Yankee’s principal potential competitor, the New
York Cash Exchange (NYCE) shared electronic
banking network, had not yet signaled its intent to
enter the POS debit market.  Moreover, it would
take NYCE at least three years to build up the
necessary infrastructure.  It was believed that
Yankee could time the launch of POS debit
services so as to get rapid acceptance by retailers
and rapid growth in transaction volume and to
forestall the competition from making serious
inroads into Yankee’s potential merchant base.
Yanak concluded that the longer Yankee waited to
enter the POS debit market, the greater the
chance that entry would pay off.  While waiting too
long could mean losing ground to the competition,
it had the benefit of resolving some uncertainties.
By waiting, Yankee could see if the environment
would become more favorable and whether the
POS debit experience in other regions of the U.S.,
such as Texas and Florida, would parallel Cali-
Benaroch & Kauffman/Electronic Banking & Real Options Analysis
MIS Quarterly Vol. 24 No. 2/June 2000 209
fornia.  Moreover, in the meantime, efforts could
be made to lobby for a change in Massachusetts’
law, encouraging more rapid adoption by retailers.
Debit Card Service Deployment
Decision Making:  A Real
Option Perspective
In this section we apply real options analysis to
Yankee’s investment decision and assess claims
concerning the main benefits and drawbacks of
this analysis approach.  We first discuss methodo-
logical issues involved in establishing the suit-
ability of real options analysis to Yankee’s
situation and in eliciting relevant information for
the analysis.  We next explain how the primary
findings of our analysis are derived as well as
examine how sensitivity analysis capabilities can
be used to supplement these findings.  The pri-
mary analysis findings indicate two major conclu-
sions:  (1) immediate entry by Yankee into POS
debit services involves a negative NPV and (2) the
value of the deferral option Yankee possessed
suggests entry in three years.  These conclusions
agree with the actual decision that Yankee’s
senior executive made at the time based on
“guesstimates.”   Finally, we discuss implications
of these findings for Yankee’s management.
Study Methodology Issues
Based on the preliminary case study details
provided in the previous section, it seems that in
1987 Yankee had the flexibility to postpone the
entry decision, akin to having a real deferral option
on an investment opportunity.  Provided that
Yankee indeed possessed such an option, a real
options approach would have brought ease and
conceptual clarity to Yankee’s investment analy-
sis.  Management’s experience suggested that the
expected payoffs from a POS debit rollout would
be asymmetric and their high potential variability
would be the key to making the right decision.
Hence, real options analysis could have helped to
structure expectations about the future in a way
that matched the thinking of Yankee’s manage-
ment.  In the same spirit, it could have permitted
conducting sensitivity analysis in a way that
matcheed Yanak’s intuition by allowing him to
frame changes in expectations about payoff
drivers in terms of the payoff variability that might
be encountered (rather than in terms of changes
in the possible payoff levels, their probability, and
the respective discount rate used).
On this premise, our next step was to establish a
structured interviewing format based on a strong
questionnaire that would enable us to cast
Yankee’s investment decision as a real options
analysis problem, identify a suitable option pricing
model, get all model parameters, obtain pro-
prietary and public data, triangulate with different
people in the firm, etc. The interview included two
parts.
Part 1:  Establishing the Existence
of Yankee’s Option
The first part of the interview gathered evidence
needed to establish the existence of Yankee’s
deferral option and its nature.  It included over 10
questions aimed at gauging the strategic impor-
tance of entering the POS debit market, the
factors that allowed Yankee to wait, the factors
that required Yankee to wait, and what Yankee
expected to gain by deferring entry.  The primary
finding that emerged from this part can be sum-
marized by the answers to three key questions.
One question is:  What kind of option did Yankee
possess?  Yankee possessed an American
deferral option on a dividend paying asset.  The
asset underlying this option is the potential stream
of revenues from an investment opportunity that
will materialize only once Yankee enters the POS
debit market any time starting in 1987, where the
dividends are the revenues lost during the time
Yankee deferred entry into this market.
Another question is:  Where did the option come
from and at what cost?  Unlike a financial option
that is purchased for a cash fee, Yankee obtained
its deferral option at no direct cost.  Generally, a
firm can obtain a deferral option at no cost if it
faces no credible competitive threat of losing the
deferred investment opportunity (Dixit and Pindyck
1994).  This is clearly true in the case of a mono-
poly.  In case of a duopoly, the option exists for
the “leader” among two competitors who made
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indirect investments in building up, over time,
managerial competencies, reputation, IT infra-
structure, etc.; if there is no clear leader, both
firms may have the option, but only the first mover
would enjoy its full benefits.  Yankee operated in
a duopoly, where it maintained a leadership posi-
tion because of prior investment in its ATM
network infrastructure in New England.  As this
infrastructure acts as a complementary asset to
POS debit capabilities, Yankee possessed most of
the resources needed to enter the New England
POS debit market in 1987.  The only viable com-
petitor, NYCE, did not show any intent to enter this
market at that time, in part because it lacked the
necessary infrastructure in New England.  Hence,
as far as project valuation decision-making is
concerned, Yankee’s only option cost was the
opportunity cost of delaying entry—the revenues
lost during the deferral period—and a negligible
opportunity cost borne by the slim risk of losing
the investment opportunity to NYCE (which,
counter to expectations, might act earlier than
expected).
The third question is:  Where did Yankee’s option
value come from?  The option value stemmed
from Yankee’s belief that it could resolve some of
the uncertainties concerning acceptance of POS
debit services.  Yankee had the ability to wait and
learn more about the investment, to be able to
better assess it and to subsequently avoid it if the
expected revenues turned out to be unattractive.
Yankee could passively observe how the POS
debit business evolved in other parts of the
country and it could actively try to lower the risk of
expected revenues (e.g., lobby for a change in
Massachusetts’ law).
Part 2:  Choosing a Pricing Model and
Eliciting Model Parameters
Upon precisely characterizing Yankee’s deferral
option, the second part of the structured interview
aimed at eliciting relevant information for
analyzing Yankee’s situation from a real options
perspective.  In preparing the questions for this
part, we had to sort out several methodological
issues that would enable us to answer such
questions as:
• What option pricing model should be used to
evaluate Yankee’s deferral option?
• What kinds of evidence would be needed to
establish the primary assumptions for the
analysis?
• How should we elicit relevant information
concerning model parameters, especially
concerning variances?
• How should we combine publicly available
background information with interview infor-
mation?
Starting with the choice of model, it was clear that
the Black-Scholes model cannot be used directly
because Yankee’s deferral option is American and
on a dividend paying asset.  However, one variant
of this model, called Black’s approximation, is
relatively simple and accurate in pricing such an
option (Hull 1993, p. 235).  For the simplest case,
Black’s approximation assumes the existence of
an American call that matures at time T, where the
underlying asset pays a dividend Dt at time t, 0 <
t < T.  To find whether an early exercise at time t
is more profitable, the Black-Scholes model is
used to calculate the prices of European options
that mature at T and t, denoted  and , and
then the American price is set to .
To compute , the value of the underlying asset
in Equation 1' must be Vt:  V less the foregone
dividend Dt discounted for the period T–t.  This
procedure is easily extended for the case of
Yankee, in which there are a number of dividends
corresponding to the cash flows lost during a
deferral period spanning time 0 to time t.
Respectively, looking for the optimal deferral
period in Yankee’s case requires solving Equation
2 for , namely:
(3)
In this equation, d’1 and d’2 are defined in equation
1', and Vt is defined as:
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= Active NPV
(option value exercised
at time t, 0 < t < T) 
Passive NPV =
r
V0
X
Vt
rf
T
X -- exercise price (investment cost).
r -- risk-adjusted discount rate (that
NPV analysis would use ignoring
the deferral flexibility).
V0 -- all expected cash flows, cf0 … cfT,
discounted by r. 
Vt -- cash flows expected after time t, 
cft+1 … cfT, discounted by r.
T -- option’s time to maturity.
-- volatility of V. 
rf -- risk-free discount rate.
-- rate of return shortfall (adjustment
for a risk-averse investor).
E
tC
EC0
Calculated using DCF analysis Calculated using Black’s approximation
δ δ
σ
σ
Figure 4.  Parameters Used for Investment Evaluation Using Black’s Approximation
(4)
where cft denotes the cash flow expected at time
t and r is the risk-adjusted discount rate (that DCF
analysis would use ignoring the deferral flexibility).
As Equation 3 and Figure 4 show, compared to
DCF analysis, Black’s approximation also involves
one trivial parameter—rf—and two more difficult to
estimate parameters—c and G.
We next had to reveal information for estimating
the model parameters, assuming that the actual
entry would occur any time after mid-1987.  We
first focused on the parameters involved in the
DCF analysis preceding real options analysis:  X,
V, r, and T (see Figure 4).  The findings that
emerged from the interview are stated in terms of
the major assumptions that Yankee made, as
listed in Appendix A and briefly summarized
below.
On the cost side, there were two dimensions of
entry.  First, in terms of X, Yankee’s initial invest-
ment in the technical implementation would be
relatively small—around $400,000—compared to
a non-participant in the ATM network business in
New England.   Second, a periodic (operational)
discretionary marketing expense on POS debit
promotion would be relatively low—about $40,000
a year—until resources were shifted away from
promoting ATM services once stable growth had
been achieved.
Eliciting information for estimating V involved
questions concerning estimates of expected
revenues and the basis for those estimates.
According to Yanak, the New England POS debit
market was considered similar to the California
market (but smaller).  Based on this assumption,
all estimates of expected revenues and their
growth rate were produced.  Yanak felt that,
starting from scratch, Yankee’s POS debit trans-
actions volume would grow over a five year term
to about 50 million per year in 1992, where each
transaction would generate about 10 cents.  This
contrasts with a 1992 volume of about 40 million
ATM transactions, built up over a 10 year period.
The next parameter was the rate, r, for discounting
costs and revenues.  Yankee’s management
agreed that, ignoring the embedded deferral
flexibility, the risk characteristics of investing in
POS debit services were similar to those of other
electronic banking investments.  Thus, to compute
the passive NPV, we could use a discount rate of
r = 12%, which approximates the rate used for
capital budgeting of other electronic banking
investments at the time.
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Finally, as to the investment time horizon, T, the
following emerged.  First, Yankee looked at the
period between January of 1987 and June of
1992, corresponding to an analysis horizon of 5.5
years.  Second, from the moment Yankee enters
the POS debit market, it takes one year to begin
servicing customers and for revenues to start
arriving.  This implies a maximal deferral period of
four years—from January of 1987 until January of
1991.
As seen in Figure 4, real options analysis (using
Black’s approximation) requires information
concerning three additional parameters:  rf, c, and
G.  Of these parameters, only the last two are hard
to estimate.
To elicit information for estimating c, we asked
about the distribution of revenues (i.e., normal,
skewed to the high or the low side), the perceived
variance of potential revenues (if there were any)
linked to uncertainties that might be resolved, the
range of the potential revenues on the high and
low ends, etc.  Considering only direct quantifiable
revenues, the answers to such questions would
have permitted us to precisely estimate c using
schemes like the ones summarized in Appendix B.
However, we also had to consider future potential
revenues from business opportunities that were
not perceived to exist in 1987 but could be
spawned by growth options embedded in
Yankee’s investment.  For example, the possibility
that state governments would start using
electronic payments to deliver welfare benefits
was one indication of how large the non-tangible
benefits could be.  While information about such
non-tangible benefits helped us to better under-
stand Yanak’s feelings about the POS debit busi-
ness, it was not sufficient to enable us to quantify
these benefits and precisely estimate c.  Yanak
nonetheless was able to say that, given the
possible size of indirect revenues as well as
uncertainties linked to the direct revenues
(Figure 3), and especially the one concerning the
Massachusetts market, the variability of expected
revenues could be as high as 100%.  Eventually,
because we could elicit quantifiable estimates only
for direct revenues, we decided to try the following
approach: first use 50% as an initial plausible
value for c, and then use sensitivity analysis to
see if the analysis results are robust to changes of
c within the lower and upper bounds Yankee’s
management assigned to c.  Only if the analysis
results turned out not to be robust to changes in c
would we be forced to find new ways to elicit more
information for precisely estimating c.  This ap-
proach made sense because it enabled us to pro-
ceed and get a sense for the potentially significant
impact of non-quantifiable revenues.
As to G, the rate shortfall adjustment for risk-
aversion, this parameter is even more difficult to
estimate than c.  In principle, one way to estimate
G is based on the utility function of Yankee’s
management.  However, given our goal, we felt it
was not necessary to estimate G for one reason.
Since the options theory from finance shows that
the value of call options is relatively insensitive to
changes in discount rates (Cox and Rubinstein
1985), our intuition suggested that sensitivity
analysis is a good way to check whether the
results of risk-neutral valuation are sufficiently
robust to cover the case of a risk-averse decision
maker.  The analysis results reported shortly con-
firmed our intuition.
Analysis Results
With the above information, we were ready to
apply real options analysis to the investment
decision Yankee faced in 1987.  The analysis
results for immediate entry in 1987 can be
summarized based on the figures calculated using
DCF analysis (see Appendix A).  The passive
NPV is negative (–$76,767), so immediate entry is
not worthwhile.  Moreover, what-if sensitivity
analysis results show that the passive NPV
remains negative even when the discount rate, r,
drops from 12% to 8%.  This result suggests that,
even using a lower discount rate that “artificially”
reflects a lower investment risk due to the upside
potential of revenues, immediate entry is not
worthwhile.
This brings up the key question Yankee faced:
How long should entry into the POS debit market
be postponed?  We emphasize that this question
is relevant even for a positive passive NPV.  For
instance, when the discount rate drops to 7%, to
equal the risk-free rate, the passive NPV becomes
positive at $7,069, suggesting that immediate
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entry is worthwhile.  Even if 7% were a realistic
discount rate, r, the real options analysis results
we present next clearly show that deferring entry
is more worthwhile.  The same holds if a positive
NPV is obtained as a result of expanding the
analysis horizon (beyond the original 5.5 years
horizon) to account for additional positive cash
flows expected past June 1992.
For a deferred entry, we used the same assump-
tions, except that the investment is made any time
between mid-1987 and early 1991.  The same
time horizon of 5.5 years is used to reflect that the
analysis is performed for the 1987 time frame as
well.  We calculated the option value for different
exercise dates ranging from zero to four years at
six-month intervals.  The upper part of Table 2
shows the results computed using Black’s
approximation, assuming risk-neutrality (with G =
0%).  These results can be summarized as
follows.
• The value of  the deferral option exercised at
maturity T = 4, as if it were a European
option, is = $65,300.
• For deferrals between 1.5 and 3.5 years, the
value of the option, , as if it were
European and it could be exercised at any
time t < T, is greater than .
• The value of Yankee’s American deferral
option is = $152,955.  This value corres-
ponds to the optimal deferral time of t = 3, at
which  reaches its maximum for
any t @ T.
These results suggest two conclusions, contingent
on the information Yankee had at the time.  First,
it is beneficial for Yankee not to wait four years to
enter the POS debit market, so long as the roll out
occurs after the end of the first year, because
 for 1 < t < 4.  Second, optimal deferral
time is three years, because  = $152,955 > 
for all t £3.5  The logic behind these conclusions is
simple.  Recall from the option-based rule for
investment timing that, for certain expected values
of V, the values of the investment opportunity
(option) and the operational project (underlying
asset) would be equal, and so a risk-neutral firm
would be indifferent between holding either.  By
the same token, profit maximizing decisions taken
on behalf of the firm’s shareholders would prompt
it to undertake the investment opportunity at that
point in time at which the investment opportunity—
in this case, the American deferral option—takes
on its maximum value.  Alternately, as the deferral
option in effect enabled Yankee to “buy” informa-
tion for resolving uncertainties prior to undertaking
the investment opportunity, at a cost equaling the
revenues lost during deferral, it is best to convert
the opportunity into an operational project (i.e.,
exercise the option) at the time point where the
cost of information Yankee could buy exceeds the
value of this information.
To see the impact of assuming risk-aversion, we
included in Table 2 what-if analysis results for the
rate of return shortfall, G, changing from 0% to
7%, it upper limit equaling rf.  These results show
that, for a deferral time longer than half a year, the
recommendation still holds because the option
value drops by less than 2% when G goes to its
upper limit.  Such a small change in the option
value is explained by the relative insensitivity of
call options to a change in discount rates (Cox
and Rubinstein 1985).  This crucial observation
indicates that the recommendation produced
based on risk-neutral valuation is robust enough
to cover the case of risk-averse decision makers
in Yankee’s case (and probably other cases).
For reasons we explain shortly, Table 2 includes
other results based on conventional simulation-
based sensitivity analysis.  These results, which
reflect changes in one parameter at a time, show
that the recommendation to postpone entry for
three years is robust to changes in key para-
meters.  It holds for the discount rate (used to
calculate Vt) changing from 12% to 7%, for the
variability of revenues changing from 10% to
100%, for a New England market size that is
between 20% and 30% of that in California, and
for an investment cost between $200,000 and
$700,000.  Only when the investment cost is as
low as $100,000 does the analysis suggest
postponing entry for just 2.5 years.
5A conventional NPV-like analysis would suggest that
the optimal deferral time is 2.5 years, because Vt−Xt
reaches its maximum value for t = 2.5.  However, such
an analysis would be misleading because the (12%)
discount rate used is not adjusted to reflect the upside
potential of revenues.
Table 2.  Optimal Investment Time and Sensitivity Analysis Data
t (length of deferral period in
years)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
 Calendar time Jan. 87 July 87 Jan. 88 July 88 Jan. 89 July 89 Jan. 90 July 90 Jan. 91
Black-Scholes Parameter Values
Vt (V0 less revenues lost during
waiting)
$323,233 $342,216 $360,083 $376,230 $389,207 $395,566 $387,166 $344,813 $223,295
Xt  (discounted investment cost,
X0)
$400,000 $393,179 $386,473 $379,883 $373,404 $367,036 $360,777 $354,625 $348,577
Vt – Xt ($76,767) ($50,963) ($26,391) ($3,652) $15,803 $28,530 $26,389 ($9,812) ($125,281)
Risk-Neutral Valuation—Black’s Approximation Results for G = 0%
 (option maturing at T) $65,300
 (option maturing at t) $0 $32,024 $66,093 $96,830 $123,786 $144,565 $152,95 $134,873 $65,300
$65,300 $65,300 $66,093 $96,830 $123,786 $144,565 $152,955 $134,873 $65,300 
Recommended deferral time
(years)
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Risk-Averse Valuation—Black’s Approximation Results (of max(CT, Ct)) for 0 @  G @ rf.
G (rate of return shortfall)
0% $65,300 $65,300 $66,093 $96,830 $123,786 $144,565 $152,955 $134,873 $65,300
4% $47,228 $47,228 $65,868 $96,418 $123,164 $143,721 $151,892 $133,643 $64,223
7% $36,656 $36,656 $65,408 $95,570 $121,877 $141,967 $149,684 $131,115 $62,119
What-If Analysis Results (for max(CT, Ct))
r (discount rate for calculating
Vt)
7% $119,108 $119,108 $120,839 $156,110 $186,092 $208,795 $217,870 $198,158 $119,108
10% $84,139 $84,139 $84,932 $117,765 $146,085 $167,723 $176,433 $157,693 $84,139
12% $65,300 $65,300 $66,093 $96,830 $123,786 $144,565  $152,955 $134,873 $65,300
Table 2.  Continued
c (volatility of expected
revenues)
10% $0 $457 $9,070 $27,161 $47,747 $64,253 $67,803 $43,562 $1,467
40% $0 $22,613 $51,884 $79,573 $104,369 $123,562 $130,857 $112,586 $47,617
49% $0 $31,073 $64,679 $95,117 $121,859 $142,481 $150,769 $132,682 $63,550
50% $0 $32,024 $66,093 $96,830 $123,786 $144,565 $152,955 $134,873 $65,300
51% $0 $32,977 $67,506 $98,540 $125,709 $146,643 $155,135 $137,055 $67,044
60% $0 $41,608 $80,140 $113,785 $142,824 $165,104 $174,428 $156,255 $82,446
100% $0 $80,041 $133,992 $177,401 $213,036 $239,523 $250,579 $230,032 $141,348
Xt (technical investment cost)
$100,000 $223,233 $245,658 $266,937 $286,556 $303,029 $312,898 $308,118 $269,955 $156,212
$200,000 $123,233 $151,095 $179,182 $204,771 $226,529 $241,388 $241,916 $210,894 $112,640
$399,999 $0 $32,024 $66,093 $96,830 $123,786 $144,565 $152,956 $134,874 $65,300
$400,000 $0 $32,024 $66,093 $96,830 $123,786 $144,565 $152,955 $134,873 $65,300
$400,001 $0 $32,024 $66,093 $96,830 $123,786 $144,564 $152,955 $134,873 $65,300
$700,000 $0 $1,739 $13,606 $32,321 $53,229 $72,392 $83,943 $76,690 $34,276
Market Size Relative to
California
20% $0 $5,791 $23,860 $45,408 $66,844 $85,182 $95,282 $86,566 $41,521
25% $0 $32,024 $66,093 $96,830 $123,786 $144,565 $152,955 $134,873 $65,300
30% $15,087 $84,490 $126,533 $161,771 $191,228 $212,347 $217,459 $188,644 $92,547
Assumptions
1. Vt — option’s underlying asset calculated as the present value of net revenues arriving after Yankee enters the POS debit market at any time point t, 0
@ t @ 4.
2. Xt — option’s exercise price calculated as the present value of the technical investment cost outlay (of $400,000) Yankee would make to enter the
POS debit market at the any time point t, 0 @ t @ 4.
3. c — volatility of expected revenues is 50%.
4. T — maximum deferral period is 4 years, from early 1987 to early 1991.
5. rf — 7% annual  riskfree interest  rate.
6. G — 0% rate of return shortfall adjustment for a risk-averse investor.  What-if analysis results are shown for 0 @ G @ rf.
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Additional Sensitivity Analysis
Our next step was to analyze partial derivatives in
the context of the Black-Scholes model to see
what additional useful results can be obtained for
Yankee’s situation and to assess Benaroch and
Kauffman’s claim that these derivatives offer
simple and powerful sensitivity analysis capa-
bilities.  These derivatives measure the sensitivity
of a call option to changes in volatility (c), the
value of the underlying investment asset (V), the
cost to exercise the option (X), the option’s time
decay as expiration nears (t), and changes in the
risk-free rate (rf):
 (5)
On the positive side, these derivatives do help to
answer some questions regarding the effect of
changes in model parameters on the value of the
investment opportunity.  For example, based on
ideas discussed in McGrath (1997), one question
could be:  What is the maximum pre-investment
Yankee should be willing to make to ensure that c
won’t drop by 1% (e.g., due to a lower chance for
regulatory changes in Massachusetts in the lack
of lobbying)?  This question could be answered
using vega, T, which tells us by how much the
option (investment opportunity) value changes as
a result of a 1% change in c, the variance of
expected revenues.  In our case, (assuming t = 3,
V = $387,166 for a New England market 25% the
size of California’s, X = $400,000, and c = 50%),
T = 218,284 means that an increase in c from
50% to 51% increases the net value of the
deferred investment option by $2,183.  (This is
confirmed by what-if simulation results in Table 2.)
We also found that additional useful results can
be obtained based on plots of certain derivatives,
although these plots would be produced as part of
an open-ended investigation of the decision situa-
tion.  For example, the plot in Figure 5 can help to
explain why Yankee’s management considered
waiting three years, instead of two or four years. 
We speculate that, after about three years, the
expected value of the underlying POS debit
network asset would grow more slowly than the
value of foregone revenues in the absence of
POS debit roll out.
On the negative side, upon further probing into the
use of these derivatives in Yankee’s case, we
identified two weaknesses that make these deriva-
tives of limited value.  One weakness is their
ability to yield valid answers only for questions
involving a small change in one parameter.  Like
with what-if analysis, we must assume a specific
anchor point (e.g., t = 3, V = $387,166 for a New
England market 25% the size of California’s, X =
$400,000, c = 50%, and G = 0%).  Now, because
the derivatives are not linear in their variables,
they provide reliable answers only in the imme-
diate vicinity of this anchor point.  As Figure 6
illustrates, the degree of non-linearity can vary
and thus impact the size of error made based on
linear extrapolation.  For a change of X from
$400,000 to $500,000, extrapolation based on xi,
Z, would predict a drop of $33,214 in the invest-
ment opportunity value, which deviates by more
than 14% from the $29,100 drop predicted by
numeric simulation.  (Note that Z = –0.33 means
that a $1 increase in the cost to enter the POS
debit market would cause only a net decline of 33
cents  in the investment opportunity value, as
confirmed by what-if results in Table 2.)  In the
case of c, for a change from 50% to 60%, extrapo-
lation based on T would predict an increase of
$21,828 in the investment opportunity value, and
deviate by only 1.66% from the $21,472 increase
predicted by numeric simulation.  However, note
that the dashed graph in Figure 6b becomes
highly non-linear under different assumed para-
meter values (e.g., G > 0).
When it is not possible to assume an anchor point
with a high degree of certainty, the last obser-
vation has implications on simulation-based
sensitivity analysis as well.  In Yankee’s situation,
choosing an initial plausible value of 50% for c
amounts to choosing an uncertain anchor point.
In such cases, conducting what-if analysis with
respect to two or three parameters at a time might
reveal that the analysis results change for
parameter values corresponding to points not in
Benaroch & Kauffman/Electronic Banking & Real Options Analysis
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Figure 5.  Rate of Change of Option Delta, F, as a Function of Time to Maturity, t
(a)  results for X (b) results for c
Figure 6.  Sensitivity Analysis Results Obtained Using Derivative-Based
Extrapolation and Numeric Simulation
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the proximity of the assumed anchor point.
Indeed, in Yankee’s case we found that certain
parameter values lead to results that slightly
deviate from the results reported in Table 2.  For
example, compared to the earlier recommendation
reported based on the assumed anchor point (i.e.,
sigma = 50%), when X = $200,000 and G = 5%,
the recommendation will no longer hold when c is
below 15%.  Overall, not being able to choose an
anchor point with certainty (e.g., due to parameter
estimation difficulties) requires putting more effort
into sensitivity analysis.
Another weakness of partial derivative analysis is
that it can provide answers only for parameters
that plug directly into the Black-Scholes model.
For example, a question that could be really
interesting to Yankee is: what would happen if the
assumed New England market size relative to
California’s market was 1% larger?  There is no
way to answer this question using derivative
analysis.  Since V depends on the market size
relative to California, delta with a value of F =
0.738 would only tell us that a $1 increase in V
causes a net increase of 74 cents in the value of
the investment opportunity.  Some additional com-
putation is needed to produce the result neces-
sary to answer the above question.  A somewhat
similar observation applies to ro, a.  In our case,
a = 398,567 suggests that a ±1% change in the
risk-free interest rate, rf, changes the investment
opportunity (option) value by ±$3,985, only ±2.3%
of its original value.  However, even here we must
caution the reader with respect to the reliability of
this result.  In Yankee’s case, a is not useful by
itself because we cannot express V (and X) as
explicit functions of rf.  Since  depends on Vt,
by knowing a alone we cannot say anything about
how  would change; a change in rf would also
mean changing the discount rate r (of 12%) used
to estimate Vt based on the cash flows arriving
after entry into the POS debit market (see
Figure 4).  Hence, here again, some form of what-
if simulation seems more appropriate.
Finally, we checked if the Black-Scholes model
also supports break-even analysis, following the
claim that it can derive analytically values for
volatility that are consistent with a given
investment opportunity value (Benaroch and
Kauffman 1999).  Formally, the implied volatility,
c', is the variance of the underlying asset that is
consistent with (or implied by) the other variables,
including the observed market value of the option.
Assuming that c is unknown and that all other
parameters, including the option value, are given,
one should be able to compute the Black-Scholes
implied volatility.  However, when we applied this
concept to Yankee’s case (using Excel’s goal-
seeking capabilities), some interesting questions
arose.  Specifically, by setting the investment
opportunity value to zero, we hoped to find the
minimum volatility level below which deferral need
not be considered.  But, to find this minimum level
in the context of Black’s approximation, should we
set to zero the value of the American option ( )
or the European option ( ) and for what time
point t, 0 < t @ 4?  Setting  = 0 yields an implied
volatility that we could not interpret when the
option is American.  By contrast, setting  = 0
for the optimal deferral time recommended (of t =
3) surprisingly yielded a negative implied volatility,
suggesting a possible idiosyncrasy of the Black-
Scholes model with respect to computing implied
volatility under certain parameter values.  We
concluded that the ability to calculate implied
volatility using the Black-Scholes model is of no
value in Yankee’s case (and probably other non-
trivial cases).
In summary, our experience with Yankee’s case
suggests that Black-Scholes’ derivatives cannot
easily reproduce the results produced using
simulation-based sensitivity analysis.  Neverthe-
less, we must emphasize that even simulation-
based results are obtained as an integral part of
real options analysis.  More precisely, it is the fact
that the Black-Scholes model is a closed-form
formula that allows obtaining simulation-based
sensitivity analysis results with minimal effort
(compared to, say, the binomial method).  Our
overall conclusion is that the ability of the Black-
Scholes model and its variants (e.g., Black’s
approximation) to usefully support sensitivity
analysis cannot be discarded or ignored.
Discussion
How should the option pricing analysis results be
interpreted in Yankee’s case?  The results indi-
cate that an early entry into the POS debit market
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is not worthwhile and that a rational recommen-
dation would be to defer entry for a period of three
years.  Of course, this recommendation is based
solely on the information Yankee had at the time
of the analysis in 1987.  Any new information
arriving with the occurrence of events or changes
during the recommended deferral period would
require repeating the analysis to see whether and
how the recommendation has to be revised.
What is the key benefit from using real options
analysis in Yankee’s case?  The key benefit is that
this analysis generates reliable results, regardless
of whether the passive NPV is negative or positive
and regardless of the decision maker’s assumed
risk preferences.  Moreover, even if the NPV
decision rule were to be revised to choose a
deferral period that maximizes the passive NPV,
the results would still be faulty (see footnote 5).  In
this regard, a comment is warranted regarding the
5.5 years analysis horizon Yankee used.  As has
been argued before (e.g., Trigeorgis 1996), a firm
can almost arbitrarily choose to shorten or
lengthen the analysis horizon and thus affect the
size and the sign of the passive NPV.  Yankee’s
case shows that real options analysis yields more
reliable results independent of the exact analysis
horizon considered.  This benefit generally comes
at the cost of having to estimate additional
parameters.  Estimating these parameters for
Yankee’s case did not overly complicate the
analysis, its results, or their interpretation, largely
because real options analysis provides for an
easier derivation of meaningful sensitivity analysis
results and their interpretation.  However, we
recognize that this might not be the situation in
more complicated cases.
In light of the above discussion, we feel that
applying real options analysis to Yankee’s case is
well justified—the results of our analysis can
explain rationally the actual actions taken by
Yankee.  Ultimately, largely based on intuition and
experience, it was decided that Yankee would
defer entry into the market for POS debit services.
Yankee made the move in 1989, hoping to have
the POS debit service operational by early 1990,
and it was very successful in that regard.  Yanak
thought that the timing was nearly optimal for
three reasons.  First, the uncertainty as to the
acceptance rate of POS debit services seemed
significantly lower, since by 1989 dramatic growth
had begun to occur in California’s POS debit
market.  Second, Yankee’s ATM business had
reached a mature stage, freeing up resources to
push POS debit.  Third, and most important,
however, was an unexpected event in mid-1989.
The Food Market Institute, the primary trade
association for the grocery business, released a
study that clearly demonstrated the benefits of
POS debit transactions.  The study said that for
retailers the average transaction cost per sale was
0.82% of the sale value for POS debit, in contrast
to 1.2% for checks and 2.1% for cash.  (Checks
involve depository handling costs and risk that the
writer has insufficient funds; cash is subject to
mishandling and pilfering and must be physically
moved from the supermarket to the bank by
secure means.)  The results of this study became
the primary tool in educating retailers.6
Yanak went to Yankee’s board of directors, in
early 1989, arguing in favor of rapid entry into
POS debit.  Yanak’s strategy was to go after the
largest 21 supermarket chains in New England
first.  By mid-1990, Yankee had one commitment
from Hannaford Brothers, one of the largest
supermarket chains, which decided to pilot the
service in nine supermarkets in Maine and New
Hampshire.  It took about seven months to get the
technology in place and the service was opera-
tional in early 1991.  Yankee’s second major sign-
up was Stop & Shop, the largest convenience
store chain in New England.  Stop & Shop chose
to pilot POS debit in Rhode Island in order to
assist Yankee in its efforts to persuade legislators
that POS debit was a service in the public interest.
It was hoped that this would result in a change of
the law in Massachusetts that was a serious
inhibitor to an earlier rollout.  Since then, Yankee
has been largely successful in getting the major
supermarket retailers.  In 1995, it had about 40
supermarket chains signed, out of the 100
operating in New England. 
The growth has been phenomenal, from no POS
debit terminals in 1990 to about 27,000 terminals
in early 1993.  That contrasts with a total of about
6While this event may suggest that c (variability of
revenues) could peak at some time point, we assumed
a constant c because the information available to
Yankee at the time of analysis did not indicate the
possible occurrence of this or any similar event.
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4,000 network ATMs, built up since 1984.  The
business volume grew rapidly and is expected to
continue for the next few years.  Estimates for
1996 were for more than 40 million transactions
per year.
Conclusion and Future
Research
The present paper illustrates the value of applying
real options analysis to an IT investment
embedding a real operating option.  The major
conclusion of our study is that real options
analysis provides a powerful complementary
approach for evaluating real-world IT investments
like the one in Yankee 24’s case.  Real options
analysis proved suitable for structuring senior
management’s view of the strategic value of an
investment involving an option, enabling a logical
and intuitive interpretation of the analysis results.
Moreover, it facilitates conducting sensitivity
analysis, which helps to probe and subsequently
to understand the nature of an investment in terms
that match the way a manager thinks about the
problem.
Beyond just illustrating the value of real options
analysis, our study also investigated several
methodological issues that had to be addressed in
the context of Yankee’s case.  We feel that our
experience with respect to these issues can help
to make the use of real options analysis more
practical for senior managers.
One methodological issue, which arose when our
interviewees had some difficulty expressing the
variability of expected project payoffs as a single
number, c, is the need to develop ways to
estimate this number.  In Yankee’s case, instead
of precisely estimating c, we used an approach
that leads us to make our first recommendation.
Recommendation 1:  When it is difficult
to obtain a precise estimate of c (e.g.,
because of non-tangible benefits), start
with an initial plausible estimate of c and
use sensitivity analysis to see if and how
the analysis results change within the
estimated lower and upper bounds of c.
This approach worked well in Yankee’s case,
although it required putting more effort into sensi-
tivity analysis (For the reasons discussed earlier).
However, are there situations were this approach
will not work?  Or is it possible to structure the
approach better so that it would fit a wide range of
situations?  We referred to alternative estimation
schemes in Appendix B.  Can such schemes lead
to more useful results?  If so, under what circum-
stances should each scheme be used?  More
generally, thinking of variability as just another
word for risk brings to mind Clemons (1991), who
showed that IT managers deal with risk of various
forms (functionality risk, project risk, market risk,
etc.).  Would linking the variability of expected
payoffs to specific sources of risks present in a
target investment simplify the estimation task?
Another important methodological issue we
examined pertains to the notion of risk-neutral
valuation.  Since the introduction of the real
options approach in the IS literature, the risk-
neutral valuation of this approach has been
criticized as being inadequate for options on non-
traded investments (e.g., Kauffman et al. 1993, p.
588).  Elsewhere we offered economic arguments
that address this criticism (Benaroch and Kauff-
man 1999).  Here we used a version of the Black-
Scholes model that adjusts for risk-aversion by
discounting the value of an option by the so-called
rate of return shortfall, G.  While G is another
difficult to estimate parameter, our experience in
Yankee’s case suggests the following recom-
mendation.
Recommendation 2:  If you don’t sub-
scribe to risk-neutral valuation, and thus
have to estimate the rate of return short-
fall, G, first calculate a risk-neutral option
value using the Black-Scholes model
and then use sensitivity analysis with the
adjusted Black-Scholes model to see
how robust is the option value with
respect to G.
In Yankee’s case, even when G is at its upper
limit, corresponding to the case of a very risk-
averse investor, the adjusted model computes an
option value that is only 2% lower than the value
computed using risk-neutral valuation.  Such a
small drop in the option value is usually not
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enough to change the investment decision
suggested by risk-neutral valuation.  This conclu-
sion is consistent with what the finance literature
postulates about the sensitivity of options to
discount rates.
To summarize the estimation issues, a pragmatic
message from our study is that the lack of exact
parameter estimates is not always crucial.  Only
when the calculated value of an investment (plus
embedded options) is marginally positive are
precise parameter estimates necessary.  Sensi-
tivity analysis, which is always needed for real-
world decision problems, is an effective way to
obtain useful and reliable results in the absence of
exact parameter estimates.  
Relative to sensitivity analysis, another methodo-
logical issue we studied, our experience with the
Black-Scholes model in Yankee’s case suggests
the following.  Whereas partial derivative analysis
seems to be of little value in supporting sensitivity
analysis, the closed-form of this model permits
easy generation of useful what-if sensitivity analy-
sis results.  This suggests the next recommen-
dation.  
Recommendation 3:  For sensitivity
analysis purposes, it is more useful to
rely on numeric, simulation-based analy-
sis capabilities than on the capabilities
associated with Black-Scholes’ partial
derivatives.
We must admit that, knowing that partial deriva-
tive analysis is much used in the investment arena
leaves us with the question:  Is there a way to
make partial derivative analysis more useful in the
context of IT capital investments?
Our experience with the Yankee case also helped
to surface other important methodological issues
relevant to investments that are more complex
than the one we presented.  Such investments
typically embed multiple cascading (compound)
options.  For example, for some projects, it is
possible to stage the investment, and defer some
of the stages, and abandon the project before all
stages are completed, etc.  Evaluating such pro-
jects requires guidelines for dealing with two
related complexities.
One set of guidelines should help to recognize the
options potentially present in an investment.  Our
experience indicates the need for a taxonomy of
real IT options that identifies the exact assump-
tions, conditions, and prerequisites underlying the
existence of each option type.  Using such a
taxonomy, it should be possible to develop struc-
tured questionnaires that can help an analyst
identify readily all of the options that might be
involved in a given situation and obtain the evi-
dence necessary to establish the existence of a
few central ones.
Another set of guidelines should help identify
which of the options potentially present in an
investment ought to be brought into existence
through additional investment.  These guidelines
must consider that the cost of creating an option,
keeping it alive, and exercising it could exceed the
value that the option adds to the investment.  This
is especially true when the value of a compound
option involving a series of cascading options is
smaller than the sum of values of the individual
options (for details, see Trigeorgis 1996).  In this
sense, identifying which options are worth creating
also requires using an option pricing model that is
intuitive, flexible, and does not require managers
to understand all of the mechanics of pricing
complex options.  So far the IS literature on IT
options has examined three models: the binomial,
the Black-Scholes, and the asset-for-asset
exchange models.  The finance literature offers
other models for different types of real options
(Hull 1993).  In Yankee’s case, the choice of
model was relatively straightforward.  However,
when the investment is more complex, identifying
the right model to employ requires mapping
characteristics of the specific IT option being
analyzed to the assumptions that each model
makes (Benaroch and Kauffman 1999).  
In conclusion, we invite the reader to consider the
strengths of real options analysis in a variety of IT
investment contexts.  To this end, we illustrated
how the BlackScholes model can be applied in the
case of an IT investment option and we explored
the power of its sensitivity analysis capabilities as
an interpretative mechanism for the results.  We
also encourage the reader to consider pursuing
some of the issues we identified so that option
pricing concepts and models become more useful
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and accessible to IT practitioners and
researchers.
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APPENDIX A
DCF Analysis for Yankee 24’s
Immediate Entry
The data gathered using our structured interview with Yankee 24’s senior management suggests the
following assumptions concerning the parameters involved in an immediate entry into the POS debit
services market:
1. The POS debit transaction volume expected in New England is estimated based on the experience
in California, assuming that the POS debit New England market is 25% the size of the market in
California
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• Until the end of 1991, the total number of POS debit transactions in California was around 12
million; by the end of 1992, the number of transactions per month rose to 10 million.  These
figures imply a 16% per month growth rate in transaction volume in California between 1985 and
1992, consistent with expert estimates of the growth rate expected between 1993 and 1996.  To
obtain the periodic transaction volume in New England, we applied this growth rate to a base of
2,500,000 transactions for December 1992, based on the 10,000,000 figure in California.  The
base figure is discounted back by the 16% growth rate per month, and the monthly transaction
volumes are aggregated. 
2. The revenue per transaction is 10 cents.
3. The operational marketing cost is estimated at $40,000 a year.
4. The initial technical investment cost is estimated at $400,000.
5. The discount rate, r, used to compute the passive NPV (ignoring the deferral flexibility) is 12%.
6. The analysis horizon is 5.5 years, from early 1987 until (and including) early 1992.
7. The time it takes to begin servicing customers (and receiving revenues) once an entry decision is
made is one year.
Based on these assumptions, Table A1 shows the (passive) NPV we calculated for Yankee 24’s immediate
entry. 
Table A1.  Passive NPV Analysis of Yankee’s Immediate Entry into POS Debit
Services
Year -
Month
Number of 
Transactions
Operational
Revenues
Operational
Costs
Net
Revenues
Investment
Cost Cash Flows
Jan. 87 0 $0 $0 $0 $400,000 ($400,000)
July 87 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Jan. 88 3,532 $353 $20,000 ($19,647) $0 ($19,647)
July 88 8,606 $861 $20,000 ($19,139) $0 ($19,139)
Jan. 89 20,969 $2,097 $20,000 ($17,903) $0 ($17,903)
July 89 51,088 $5,109 $20,000 ($14,891) $0 ($14,891)
Jan. 90 124,470 $12,447 $20,000 ($7,553) $0 ($7,553)
July 90 303,258 $30,326 $20,000 $10,326 $0 $10,326
Jan. 91 738,857 $73,886 $20,000 $53,886 $0 $53,886
July 91 1,800,149 $180,015 $20,000 $160,015 $0 $160,015
Jan. 92 4,385,877 $438,588 $20,000 $418,588 $0 $418,588
NPV:  ($76,767)
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APPENDIX B
Plausible Schemes for Estimating c
Option pricing models represent the uncertain payoffs expected from an investment, V, using a probability
distribution, and this requires having an estimate of the variability of V, c.  To this end, the recent literature
on real options discusses several schemes for estimating c based on market data (e.g., Amram and
Kulatilaka 1999; Luehrman 1998).  Here we summarize only a few of the more basic schemes that can be
used to estimate c.
1. Supposing that an estimate of V is available, a subjective prediction that V will deviate by ±F% means
that F is c in percent terms (Brealey and Myers 1988, p. 497).  This scheme is straightforward, but
somewhat naïve.  Management would rarely be able to directly come up with an adequate estimate
of ±F%.
2. Assuming that multiple sets of contingent cash flows exist, each with different subjective probabilities,
let Vi be set i of predicted payoffs.  By computing a separate internal rate of return (IRR) for each Vi,
c can be the standard deviation of the computed IRRs (Copeland and Weston 1988, p. 426).
Compared to the first scheme, this scheme forces management to take an extra step that can make
the estimate of c more reliable.
3. If we know the probability distribution of the expected project revenues and we can specify
mathematically the functional relationships between input and output variables, a Monte Carlo
simulation can be used to estimate c (Luehrman 1998).  Thus, since the variance associated with the
present value of expected cash flows captures the uncertainty due to multiple possible future
outcomes, a Monte Carlo simulation of the future outcomes can establish c.  As a variation of the
second scheme, this scheme forces management to probe deeper into the uncertain nature of V in
order to produce an even more reliable estimate of c.
4. Where S is the price of a “twin security”—a traded security that has the same risk characteristics as
(i.e., is perfectly or highly correlated with) the project under consideration—both V and S have the
same rate of return and volatility.  Thus, c can be estimated as the variability of the rate of return on
S.  This scheme is readily applicable in two cases.  One is when there is a publicly traded firm whose
primary revenue generating services (e.g., ATM services, Internet advertising) parallel the services
that the target project would yield to generate payoffs.  Another case is when the primary risk in the
target project is due to reliance on a risky IT that is the main product sold by a traded firm (e.g., CASE
tools, multimedia tools).
5. Where the sources of project value uncertainty have been recognized (technical risk, competition risk,
etc.), we propose that c can be plausibly broken down into its components.  If ri is one of the risks
contributing to the uncertainty of V and c(ri) denotes the direct contribution of ri to the variance of V,
then c can be estimated as:
When risks are not correlated, this equation becomes a simple sum of independent elements
contributing to the variability of V, where each element can be estimated using one of the above
schemes.  This scheme is logical, but it remains to be seen whether it is easy to apply in practice.
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